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HIGHWA YS AND BI-WA YS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
RICHARD J. LAZARUS· 
INTRODUCTION 
The highway between Selma and Montgomery in Alabama 
and the highway system surrounding the City of Atlanta in 
neighboring Georgia are quite different in many obvious re-
spects. The former is U.S. Route 80 that travels along a mostly 
rural area of Alabama and is a mere 54 miles long. The latter 
surrounds a major metropolitan area in neighboring Georgia 
and consists of 1,016 miles of state roads and 218 miles of inter-
state highways, adding up to 5000 lane miles.1 U.S. Route 80 is 
most famous for an historic civil rights march that occurred 
upon it in 1965, prompting Congress in 1996 to proclaim the 
highway a "national historic trail."2 The Atlanta highway sys-
tem, in contrast, is best known as the site of the highest average 
vehicular miles traveled (35 milesj day j person) of any place in 
the world.3 The Georgia Department of Transportation boasts 
that 28 billion miles are driven each year in the Atlanta high-
way system, which is the equivalent of "58,000 round trips to 
the moon! II 4 
Each of these highways is significant, albeit in very differ-
ent ways, to environmental justice. Each illustrates the reasons 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This essay is based on a . 
talk presented at the "Civil Rights in the New Decade" symposium held at Cumber-
land School of Law on February 15, 2001. I am grateful to the students at Cumberland 
and the editors of the C/lInberland Law Review for inviting me to partici pa te in the 
symposium. I would also like to thank Rachel Entman, Georgetown University Law 
Center Class of 2001, for her excellent research in the preparation of both the talk and 
this essay. 
1 See State of Georgia Department of Transportation Website for District 7, 
http://www.dot.state.ga.us/homeoffs/d7/dist7.htm (last visited March 24, 2001) 
[hereinafter Georgia Transp. Dept. Website]. 
2 Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
333,110 Stat. 4093, § 501 (1996). 
3 SprawlCities, http://www.islandpress.com!ecocompass/ community /sprawl. 
html (last visited March 24, 2001). 
• Georgia Transp. Dept. Website, supra note 1. 
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why the environmental justice movement has risen to such na-
tional prominence during the past several decades. Both high-
ways also provide an opportunity for more fully considering 
the obstacles that the environmental justice movement faces in 
its present effort to develop positive law consistent with the 
transformation in norms that the movement has already 
achieved. Finally, the two highways provide guidance on how 
some of those present obstacles may well best be surmounted 
in the future. 
The purpose of this essay is to discuss the past, present, 
and future of the environmental justice movement as illus-
trated by these two highways. The essay is divided into three 
parts. The first part describes environmental justice, seeking 
both to place it in a broader historical perspective and to dis-
cuss how it relates to civil rights law and environmental law. 
The second part undertakes a closer examination of the chal-
lenges presented by efforts to fashion positive law to address 
environmental justice norms. This discussion considers why it 
has proven so difficult for both civil rights and environmental 
law to evolve in a responsive fashion. Particular attention is 
paid to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,5 which has been 
an area of emphasis for many in the environmental justice 
movement. Finally, the essay speculates on where progress is 
more likely to be made in the future in terms of securing legal 
bases for the promotion of environmental justice objectives. 
The essay concludes that the two highways that bookend the 
essay suggest possible bi-ways to environmental justice based 
on both environmental and civil rights laws. 
I. PLACING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Fifty four miles may not seem very far to travel by car. But 
in March 1965, it was a very long walk. It was two weeks after 
"Bloody Sunday" in Selma-the confrontation between Ala-
bama State Troopers and civil rights protestors on Edmund 
Pettus Bridge in Selma-when the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther 
King led marchers on U.S. Route 80 from Selma to Montgom-
ery. U.S. Route 80 is a "national historic trail" today because of 
the historic role assigned to Reverend King's march in events 
leading to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 later 
5 42 usc. § 2000d-d(7) (1994). 
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that same year.6 
Walking from Selma to Montgomery along U.S. Route 80 
today, one passes by the small community of Lowndesboro in 
Lowndes County. Just off the road is a 670 acre site for a pro-
posed landfill. The landfill would receive 1,500 tons of solid 
waste a day. Nearby the proposed site are signs declaring 
"Don't Trash the Treasure! ," in loud protest to the landfill's 
possible siting there? 
The resulting visual imagery is extraordinary in its poten-
tial symbolic significance and in its meaning for environmental 
justice. At the crossroads of u.s. Route 80 and the site of the 
proposed landfill is a temporal and spatial joining of two of the 
most successful movements for social change during the last 
century: the civil rights and environmental movements. 
Each of these movements resulted in the passage of an in-
credible number of far-reaching laws. Both sets of laws chal-
lenged settled business practices in Virtually every arena. But, 
even more than that, they challenged individual behavior. They 
questioned the morality of entrenched attitudes and made 
unlawful what had previously been common practices. They 
are, to that extent, subversive in their thrust.8 
Many, if not most, laws simply codify existing norms. They 
reflect the current behavior of the vast majority. They are in-
tended to denounce and rein in social outliers. The legal pre-
scription is not itself controversial. It is those who break the 
law that are controversial. 
Both civil rights law and environmental law are alike in 
that they reflect aspirational norms, not settled norms. They 
reject the past and present. And they seek a better future. They 
challenge current social, economic, and political forces that 
sometimes consciously and more often subconsciously promote 
means and ends in fundamental opposition to nondiscrimina-
tion and environmental protection objectives. As a result, both 
kinds of law are unaVOidably controversial. They are tumultu-
6 See gellerally J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 
1954-1965 252-85 (1987). 
7 See Somini Sengupta, At Odds ill Alabama Over a Lalldfill 011 a Historic Trai/, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, A16:1; Critics Battle Lalldfill Plall Alollg Civil Rights ROllte, AUGUSTA 
CHRON., July 10, 2000, A7. See gellerally Marlon Manuel, Landfill May Settle Alollgside 
Histon}, ATLANTA J. & CaNST., July 23, 2000, A3. 
8 For a discussion of the inherently "subversive" quality of environmental law, 
see William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most Creative Momellts ill the History of Ellvirollmelltal 
Law: The Who's, 39 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 1 (1999); see a/so Cass Sunstein, Civil Rights Legis-
latioll ill the 1990s: Thee Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 762 (1991) (" A prin-
cipal purpose of civil rights law is to undo the historical wrong .... "). 
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ous in their implementation. And they are subject to constant 
attack and second guessing. 
Environmental law also owes much in its own evolution to 
civil rights law. The pathbreaking environmental lawyers of the 
1960s and 1970s borrowed the successful strategies and tactics 
of the civil rights lawyers that preceded them. They adopted 
their models in the creation of public interest organizations, 
their protests, their use of law reform litigation, and in their 
lobbying of lawmakers. Not surprisingly, those who partici-
pated in civil rights protests, like the 1965 march from Selma to 
Montgomery, include individuals who later became active in 
the environmental movements during the 1960s and 1970s.9 
The image of a solid waste landfill alongside an historic 
civil rights highway is also telling because it reminds us of the 
potential overlap in goals of civil rights and environmental 
laws. They are not simply parallel tracts related by their aspira-
tional character. They also overlap substantively. There exists 
within their respective spheres of concern much natural sub-
stantive harmony. 
Civil rights is not just concerned with the right to vote, 
public accommodations, employment, and education. Its reach 
necessarily extends to environmental protection's core con-
cerns: public health, quality of the air we breathe, the quality of 
the water we drink, and the natural beauty of the world within 
which we live. Indeed, the environmental movement in the 
United States has been closely aligned to this historic preserva-
tion movement, which naturally extends to u.s. Route 80. 
However, the image of the landfill adjacent to U.S. Route 
80 simultaneously serves as a reminder of the potential com-
plexity of the relationship between civil rights and environ-
mental protection law. That relationship is not always so sim-
ple. Not always so direct. And not necessarily so harmonious. 
The civil rights and environmental protection pathways 
sometimes conflict. The first source of possible conflict derives 
from environmental protection law's potential to cause the very 
kinds of problems of discrimination that civil rights law seeks 
to eliminate. The second source stems from the manner in 
which the discrimination label masks nuances that blunt its 
rhetorical force. The moral force behind an accusation of dis-
crimination can itself be undermined if, over time, it is not 
9 Richard J. Lazarus, Pursillg "Ellvirolllnelltaijustice": Ti,e Distributional Effeets of 
Environmental Protfetioll, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 789 & n.l0 (1993). 
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carefully focused. Environmental protection has proven to be a 
difficult context for the necessary clear focus. 1o 
As applied to the proposed landfill along U.s. Route 80, the 
first type of conflict is evident from the landfill itself. The land-
fill is, of course, a product of environmental protection laws 
and the physical location of such pollution treatment facilities 
has been a primary focus of many in the environmental justice 
movement. Environmentalists and government regulators long 
assumed that environmental protection laws were progressive. 
To the extent, therefore, that persons of color or low income 
communities were disproportionately subject to pollution in 
the first instance, environmental protection laws would corre-
. spondingly benefit those communities in a progressive manner. 
Environmental protection laws would, accordingly, naturally 
be part of the solution to redress the impacts of past discrimi-
nation and certainly not part of the problem. l1 
What the proposed landfill in Lowndes County reminds us 
is that environmental protection laws can also be part of the 
problem. In a desire to make society as a whole better off in the 
longer term, environmental protection laws may make some 
isolated areas worse off at least in the near term. In Lowndes 
County, by literally picking up everyone's garbage, much of 
the State of Alabama is benefitted from the elimination of nu-
merous, uncontrolled garbage dumps that historically existed 
across the State. Yet, the upshot of these positive efforts to-
wards environmental protection is nonetheless an aggregation 
of residual environmental risks somewhere else, typically in 
one location. No matter how well regulated that resulting facil-
ity, it is far from automatic that the community that houses that 
facility and, hence, the associated aggregation of residual envi-
ronmental risks, is better off. Indeed, that community may well 
be worse off. 
What environmental justice teaches is that, if left to default, 
that single location is likely disproportionately to be a commu-
nity of color or low-income community.12 That skewing may 
result from racist attitudes, either surficial or subsurficial, con-
scious or subconscious, but it need not be. It can also be pro-
10 See Gerald Torres, Ellviromnental lustice: The Legal Mea/zillg of a Social Move· 
me,zt, 15 J. L. & COM. 597, 603-05 (1996). 
11 Lazarus, supra note 9, at 797-98 & n.38. 
12 See generally Alice Kaswan, Elivironmental/llstice: Bridgi,zg the Gap Between En-
vironmental Laws alld "/ustice," 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 273-78 (1997); Sheila Foster, 
Race(ial) Matters: The QllestiolZ for E,zvirollmelltal Illstice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 729-30 
(1993). 
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duced by the so-called "normal" functioning of economic and 
political forces built upon a framework of discriminatory atti-
tudes and practices long since formally and widely con-
demned. These are the same forces that result in the distribu-
tion of other kinds of societal benefits and burdens. We are 
constantly reminded how inequitable skewing of such benefits 
and burdens occur in a host of areas, including many unantici-
pated.I3 There is no reason to assume environmental protection 
is somehow immune from that same tendency.14 
Environmental protection laws, therefore, may exacerbate 
civil rights concerns rather than redress them. Substantial natu-
ral harmony exists between the civil rights and environmental 
movements. But so too is there potential for substantial 
dischordance. 
The second source of possible conflict arises out of ambigu-
ity in applying the race discrimination label in many environ-
mental protection contexts. The proposed landfill in Lowndes 
County here too is illustrative. At first, the controversy would 
seem to possess many of the trappings of a classic problem of 
environmental injustice. The proposed location would seem to 
threaten, symbolically or otherwise, a highway of enormous 
historical significance to the civil rights movement. The pro-
posed landfill would also be in a county the population of 
which is mostly African American15 and in a State that has fre-
quently been the subject of complaints that its landfills have 
historically been sited in African American communities.16 
The racial dimensions of the Lowndes County controversy, 
however, can become more clouded upon further examination. 
Supporters of the landfill stress that the closest town to the 
proposed site, Lowndesboro, is mostly white, as is much of the 
13 The most recent example dominating headlines has been so-called "racial pro-
filing," suggesting that police officers in certain communities target racial minorities 
for traffic stops in particular and criminal investigation in general. See, e.g., rver Peter-
son & David Halbfinger, New Jersey Agrees to Pay $13 Millioll ill Profilillg Suit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at A1:6. 
H For a thoughtful recent annotation of studies describing and analyzing the 
disproportionate impact of environmental hazards by race and income, see gellerally 
LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP-ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM 
AND THE RISE OFTHE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 167-83 (N.Y.U. Press 2001). 
15 See Manuel, sllpra note 7, at A3. 
16 See Letter Complaint submitted by Center on Race, Poverty & the Environ-
ment, California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, with Carol Browner, Administra-
tor USEPA (December 17, 1999) (complaint details alleged Title V[ violations by Ala-
bama Department of Environmental Management "by discriminating on the basis of 
race in issuing and modifying permits to operate municipal solid waste landfills ... 
. ") (copy on file with author). 
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opposition.17 A lawyer representing the landfill company fur-
ther points out that the private school in that town where most 
of the families send their children includes the Confederate 
Flag as their symboI.18 He suggests that the landfill opponents 
are therefore, perversely, using the "racism" label to further 
their own personal objectives, when civil rights is not their aim 
and actually something they otherwise oppose.19 In further 
support, landfill supporters stress that the County Board that 
has approved the landfill is comprised of a majority of black 
members and that the Chairman of the Board is himself black.2o 
The supporters also include at least some members of the Afri-
can American community who argue that the landfill will be 
beneficial because it will provide economic revenue. and other 
benefits to the county.21 
The purpose of this essay is not to purport. to determine 
whether, in fact, the landfill supporters are correct. in their re-
sponsive characterization of the racial dimensions of the 
Lowndes landfill controversy. It is instead to raise the issue 
because such ambiguities are not unique to this landfill and 
they underscore the difficulties often created when the race 
discrimination label is invoked in the environmental context. 
The decisionmaking process surrounding a landfill siting de-
termination is invariably quite complex, involving many mul-
tiple parties both public and private. It is for that reason inher-
ently difficult to assign cause and effect and to assign a single 
motive for anyone actor's behavior. Because there are invaria-
bly going to be a multiplicity of motivations at play, it may 
quickly become "relatively fruitless [to] search for a wrong-
doer, or in other words, the bad person with evil intent."22 
There is also a tendency among those naturally sensitive to ac-
cusations of racism to believe, mistakenly, that the accusation 
necessarily lacks merit so long as there are at least some indi-
viduals of the minority race who support their position on the 
underlying controversy. As I have suggested elsewhere,23 such 
17 See Sengupta, supra note 7, at A16:1. 
18 C. Ellis BrazaellII, Walston, WelIs, Anderson & Bains, Remarks at the "Civil 
Rights in the New Decade" symposium held at the Cumberland School of Law of 
Samford University (Feb. 15, 2001). 
19 Id. 
20 Sengupta, supra note 7, at A16:1; Manuel, supra note 7, at A3. 
21 Sengupta, supra note 7, at A16:1. 
22 Torres, supra note 10, at 602. 
23 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, "Ellvirollmental Racism! That's Wilat It 15",2000 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 255, 272-73. 
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a split within a community may instead suggest the early, yet 
incomplete successes of efforts to attain racial justice rather 
than the lack of any racial problem at all. No community or 
race need speak with one voice to have a voice. 
As suggested by the underlying complexities of the racial 
dimensions of the Lowndes County landfill controversy, the 
historical relationship between the civil rights' and environ-
mental movements is not at all simple. It is quite nuanced. And 
it is marked by converging and diverging pathways. 
The popular image of the relationship between the two 
movements has the advantage of simplicity, but the disadvan-
tage of historical inaccuracy. The popular image portrays two 
movements parallel until the late 1980s and early 1990s when 
the environmental justice movement emerged nationally. The 
environmental justice movement however, has much earlier 
roots. It can be easily traced to the sanitation and public health 
movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
These movements responded to serious public health problems, 
especially in urban areas, \aused by open sewers, uncontrolled 
garbage disposal on the streets, absence of distinct residential 
and industrial zoning classifications, and the unregulated proc-
essing and manufacturing of food. The cities suffered, accord-
ingly, from extraordinary density, disease, and epidemics.24 
The sanitation and public health movements responded by 
promoting programs of municipal sewage systems, street 
cleaning, and garbage collection. Cities promulgated zoning 
laws, smoke abatement codes, and noise ordinances. Then-
emerging statutory schemes, such as the food, drug, and meat 
inspections' statutes passed by Congress in 1906 are clear pre-
cursors of modern environmental law. To the extent that these 
laws addressed the problems of the urban poor, they are like-
wise clearly precursors to the kinds of laws being promoted by 
the environmental justice movement today.25 The extent to 
which, however, the benefits of those laws were distributed in 
an equitable and nondiscriminatory fashion is far less clear. 
An early twentieth century exainple of the potential injus-
2. See generally ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING -- THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 7-8, 55-69 (1993); RICHARD N.L. 
ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES -- A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 126-29 (1993); Robert J. Brulle, Ellvirollmflltal 
Discourse and Social Movement Organizations: A Historical and Rhetorical Perspective Oil 
the Development of u.s. Environmental Orgallizatiolls, 66 Soc. INQUIRY No.1, 58, 70 (Feb. 
1996). 
25 ANDREWS, Sllpra note 24, at 109-35. 
HeinOnline -- 31 Cumb. L. Rev. 577 2000-2001
2001] SYMPOSIUM,- LAZARUS 577 
tice in both the infliction of harm and the crafting of legal re-
dress is supplied by the tragic events surrounding Union Car-
bide's construction during the 1930s of a tunnel at Gauley 
Bridge in West Virginia. Union Carbide sought to construct the 
tunnel as part of a larger plan to build a dam, hydroelectric 
facility, and tunnel near the town of Hawk's Nest. Union Car-
bide reportedly was aware at the outset of the serious public 
health hazards to workers associated with the construction pro-
ject. The earth in the area to be excavated contained an exceed-
ingly high percentage of silica (ninety percent or more) and the 
. silica dust released by the construction would become ab-
sorbed in the workers lungs, leading to a variety of serious 
health problems, ranging from silicosis, pneumonia, and tuber-
culosis. Union Carbide sought out migratory workers for the 
project, mostly African Americans from Georgia, Alabama, 
Florida, and the Carolinas. The African American workers 
worked in the areas of the mine where the exposure was 
thought to be the highest. At least 581 of the 922 African 
American workers died. Because the hazards were greater than 
anticipated in areas thought to be less hazardous, 183 of the 291 
white workers also died.26 
Union Carbide paid relatively little in liability to those who 
were injured and died. The bodies of mostly African American 
workers were disposed of in a nearby field that, subsequently 
planted over, made it virtually impossible then to identify the 
workers and determine the cause of death. Union Carbide ul-
timately settled with 157 plaintiffs, agreeing to pay them 
$157,000. At least half that sum was paid, however, to the 
plaintiffs' attorneys. In addition, the terms of the settlement for 
allocating the money were on strict racial lines. An unmarried 
African American received $400 and a married African Ameri-
can received $600; an unmarried white man received $800 and 
a married white man received $1000; and $1600 was allocated 
to each family of deceased white men.27 
The racial divisions revealed in the Union Carbide Settle-
ment at Gauley Bridge are especially stark but not an isolated 
phenomenon. Charges of elitism have long been directed at the 
conservation movement, and with some justification. National 
26 GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 236-39; see Grover Hankins, "Visiting ti,e [niqllity 
(SillS) of the Fathers UpOIl the Childrell"; Fashiollillg a Natiollal Template of Affirmative 
Relief for Workers of Color Preselltly SlIfferillg the Chemical Effects of Past Discrimillatioll, 2 
RUTGERS RACE & 1. REV. 161, 167-68 (2000). 
27 GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 239; Hankins, supra note 26, at 167-68. 
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parks were, by design, made less accessible to the poor.28 When 
famed New Yorker Robert Moses opened up the Long Island 
beaches to the public, he also made sure that the poor and mi-
norities of the City would be less able to reach those same 
"public" beaches, by building bridges over the roads too low 
for public transit buses to pass under. 29 
Charges of environmental elitism continued throughout 
the modern environmental era. Racial minorities frequently 
complained that wealthy white neighborhoods invoked envi-
ronmental concerns as a pretense in support of exclusionary 
zoning practices designed to prevent racial segregation.30 In 
1970, the Mayor of Gary, Indiana, Richard Hatcher, responded 
to the successes of the environmental movement by stressing 
that movement's adverse impact on the cause of civil rights. 
Mayor Hatcher contended that "the nation's concern with the 
environment has done what George Wallace has been unable to 
do: distract the nation from the human problems of black and 
brown Americans."31 During the 1972 Stockholm Conference 
on the Environment, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
drew the connection differently, while emphasizing her own 
nation's priority. Gandhi declared that poverty is the worst 
kind of pollution.32 
In certain respects, the divide deepened during the 1970s. 
A 1971 poll of members of the Sierra Club disclosed that forty-
one percent of that organization's members strongly disagreed 
with the proposition that the Sierra Club should pay special 
heed to the pollution problems of the poor; only fifteen percent 
of those polled strongly agreed with the statement.33 The Sierra 
28 See GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 31-32. 
29 Marc Poirier, Ellvirollmelltal justice alld tlze Beach Access Movemellts of the 1970s 
ill COllllecticut and New jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719, 
744 n.63 (1996). 
30 See Joel Kosman, Toward A'I lllclllsiollary jurisprudellce: A Recmlceptualizatioll of 
ZOllillg, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 60 (1993); see also Yale Rabin, Expulsive ZOllillg: The 
[llequitable Legacy of Euclid, ill ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles M. 
Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1990) (discussing practice of "expulsive zoning" in 
minority neighborhoods by allowing for nonresidential uses in those neighborhoods). 
31 Leonard G. Rilt & John M. Ostheimer, COllgressio'lal Voting alld Ecological [s-
sues, 3 ENVTL. AFF. 459, 465 & n.18 (1974) (quoting The Rise of Allti-Ecology?, TIME, Aug. 
3, 1970, at 42). 
32 Karen Mickelson, RI,etoric alld Rage: Third World Voices ill illtematiollal Legal 
Discourse, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 353, 389 (1998) (,"The rich countries may look upon devel-
opment as the cause of environmental destruction, but to us it is one of the primary 
means of improving the environment of living, of providing food, water, sanitation 
and shelter, of making the deserts green and the mountains habitable."') (quoting 
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi). 
33 GOTILIEB, slIpra note 24, at 253-54. 
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Club was also pursuing at this time population control and 
anti-immigration policies that many in the civil rights commu-
nity considered racist in origin and effect.34 
By the late 19805, environmentalism seemed to exist on vir-
tually two tracks.35 There was, on the one hand, the national, 
so-called "mainstream" environmental public interest organi-
zations such as the Sierra Club, National Wildlife Federation, 
World Wildlife Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, and 
Environmental Defense Fund. These organizations were highly 
sophisticated, effective, and relatively well-funded. Their pro-
fessional staff included teams of scientists, economists, and 
lawyers trained at many of the nation's most prestigious aca-
demic institutions, who lobbied and litigated on behalf of envi-
ronmental protection goals.36 
The other, increasingly distinct track was that being devel-
oped by the rising grassroots environmental movement. This 
movement was marked by community based neighborhood 
associations rather than national organizations. Many of its 
leaders were themselves members of low-income communities 
and racial minorities. They lacked the formal training of the 
professional staff in the national groups, but possessed instead 
an expertise based on personal experience and passion. These 
grassroots organizations were often led by women.37 
The inevitable collision between the two tracks occurred in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s with the grassroots organiza-
tions' formally challenging the legitimacy and continuing rele-
vancy of the national groups.38 They demanded that the na-
tional groups pay attention to the concerns of the poor and to 
the complaints of racial minorities. They demanded that the 
national groups shift their priorities and reallocate their re-
sources on behalf of environmental justice concerns. And they 
rejected any efforts to create a national environmental justice 
organization to speak on their behalf, opting instead for a more 
decentralized framework that retained the voices of the indi-
14 Id. at 256-59. 
35 Seth Zuckerman, Ellvirollmentalism TlIms 16, THE NATION, Oct. 18, 1986, at 
368-69; GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 170. 
36 GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 117-61; Robert Percival, The Political Origills of Mod-
em Ellvirollmelltal Law: Ellvirollmwtal Legislatioll alld the Problem of Collective Actioll, 9 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL. F. 9, 13, 15-20 (1998). 
37 GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 162-204, 207-34; Marc R. Poirier, Ellvirolllllelltal/lIs-
ticejRacismjEqllity: Call We Talk?, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1083,1095 (1994). 
38 GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 260. 
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vidual communities themselves.39 
The impact on the environmental and civil rights move-
ments during the past decade has been considerable. Virtually 
all of the national environmental organizations have environ-
mental justice programs.40 They also now perceive their agenda 
differently as a result of the environmental justice movement. 
The national groups are more apt to discern the environmental 
justice dimension of a controversy that before they would have 
dismissed as outside their ambit of concern. These groups are 
more likely to forge working relationships with affected com-
munity organizations. There has been a change in culture.41 
Like many such cultural shifts, it is far from complete or 
satisfactory to those affected. There are basic cultural differ-
ences, both personal and professional. Differences in priorities 
are inevitable. And, early successes are just as likely to inten-
sify rather than reduce those differences. Whether the settle-
ment of a lawsuit or passage of a new law, the law and policy-
making processes depends on the interested parties making 
hard choices between competing priorities. 
There are some who argue that vagueness in goals and un-
derlying conflicts in priorities will severely limit the ultimate 
effectiveness of the environmental justice movement.42 My own 
view is that much has already been accomplished by the union 
of the civil rights and environmental movement and it is too 
speculative to say what the full potential of the union is for 
positive reform. The efforts to realize that potential are under-
way right now in communities throughout the nation, includ-
ing the Lowndes County landfill controversy. Opponents of the 
landfill are relying on environmental laws to prevent the siting. 
Opponents of this landfill and others in the State of Alabama 
are also relying on civil rights remedies. Their lawyers now 
include those employed by organizations, such as the Center 
for Race, Poverty, and Environment, that are specifically con-
cerned with addressing the environmental justice concerns of 
39 The rejection of a national organization was something the author witnessed 
while attending the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Confer-
ence in Washington, D.C., held in Washington, D.C. in October 1991. 
.0 The websites of these organizations all stress these programs. See, e.g., Sierra 
Club, http://www.sierraclub.org/ foundation/ programs/ environmental.asp; Envi-
ronmental Defense, http://www.edf.org/programs/EJ. 
'1 Kaswan, supra note 12, at 264-65. 
<2 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER FOREMAN, THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE (1998); Poirier, supra note 37, at 1099 ("Isn't this movement impossibly 
vague?") (quoting Dr. Michael Greve, Remarks at the St. John's Law School Environ-
mental Justice Symposium (Apr. 8, 1994)). 
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communities.43 
II. LAWMAKING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
During the past decade, a consensus has generally 
emerged that the environmental justice movement identifies 
real and substantial problems. Inequities exist based on race 
and income. These inequities relate to the burdens imposed by 
pollution in the first instance. And, even more unsettlingly, 
they may be exacerbated by governmental pollution control 
efforts. The siting of facilities is part of the problem, but not the 
exclusive source. The problems identified by environmental 
justice extend to the setting of environmental protection stan-
dards in the first instance, their implementation through permit 
requirements and conditions, and their administrative and ju-
dicial enforcement.44 Environmental justice also concerns, 
throughout these legal contexts, the need for those in the com-
munity affected by the decisions to be provided a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to participate in the 
decisionmaking process is independently valuable.45 
The dramatic increase in public awareness and, in many 
quarters, the acceptance of the teachings of the environment~l 
justice movement stand in sharp contrast to clear changes in 
positive law. There have been very few.46 This is partly because 
of controversy concerning the cause of the problems identified 
by the environmental justice movement. While many are per-
suaded that race and racial discrimination is a major cause,47 
others insist that more "neutral" market and political forces are 
the cause.48 . 
The controversies surrounding causation, however, are 
only part of the reason for the lack of formal changes in posi-
tive law. During the early 1990s, there was sound reason to be-
lieve that such changes were about to be made through federal 
43 See supra note 16. 
.. Lazarus, supra note 23, at 265-68. 
4S See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the 
Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998); Kaswan, S/lpra note 12, at 232-39. 
46 Those that have occurred have been primarily in state law. See Valerie P. Ma-
honey, Ellvirolllnelital Justice: From Partial Victories to Complete SO/utiOIlS, 21 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 361, 376-378 (1999); Recent Developments, A Survey of Ellvirollmeutal Illstice 
Legislatioll ill tile States, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1459 (1995). 
47 See, e.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990); Foster, supra note 12, at 731-38. 
48 See, e.g., Lynn Blais, Ellvirollmental Racism Recolisidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75 
(1996). 
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legislation. Federal lawmakers were then debating several pro-
posals for "environmental justice" legislation.49 The newly-
elected Vice President, Al Gore, had been a co-sponsor of one 
of those proposals.SO Members of the Democratic Party, which 
controlled both congressional chambers, included representa-
tives who voiced support for the legislation's enactment. And, 
Benjamin Chavis, the newly-appointed head of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, was espe-
cially well known for his work on environmental justice is-
sues.S1 
To a large extent, political events far broader than the envi-
ronmental justice movement simply overwhelmed any possibil-
ity of securing federal legislation. With the congressional elec-
tions in 1994, the Republican Party became the majority party 
in both chambers, for the first time in decades. The resulting 
"divided government" led to a virtual standstill in new envi-
ronmental legislation during the rest of the decade_ Environ-
mental law had, before the 1990s, been famous for its extraor-
dinary dynamism. 52 The law was constantly changing. Since 
the beginning of the modern environmental era in the early 
1970s, Congress had consistently revisited and revised in sig-
nificant respects the federal environmental protection pro-
grams. But since 1990, Congress has failed to amend any of the 
major pollution control laws. It became virtually impossible to 
achieve the legislative compromises necessary for significant 
changes in environmental law. The proffered environmental 
justice legislation was a casualty of that congressional stale-
mate. 
The challenge during most of the 1990s has, accordingly, 
been to forge redress for claims of environmental justice pri-
marily from existing law. Not surprisingly, these efforts have 
addressed the problem from two distinct angles. There have 
been efforts to try to apply existing civil rights law to the envi-
ronmental context. There have also been attempts to apply ex-
.9 See Craig Anthony Arnold, Plallllilig Milagros: Ellvirollmental Jllstice alld Lalld 
Use Regulatioll, 76 DENV. U. REV. 1,45-46 (1998). 
50 See 138 CONGo REC. 57480-02, 7489 (1992) (statement of Sen. Albert Gore, Jr. in-
troducing the Environmental Justice Act, 5.2806, 102d Congo (1st Sess. 1992)); Linda 
D. Blank, Seekillg Solutiolls to Eliviroliltlelital lliequity: The Elivirollmelltal/ustice Act, 24 
ENVTL. L. 1109, 1116-1128 (1994). 
51 See Lazarus, supra note 9, at 857 n.324. 
52 See A. Dan Tarlock, The NO/lequilibriultl Paradigm ill Ecology alld the Partial U/l-
ravelillg of Ellviroliltlelltal Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1121 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, Envi-
rOllmelltal Protectioll as a Leamillg Experiellce, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 791 (1994). 
HeinOnline -- 31 Cumb. L. Rev. 583 2000-2001
2001] SYMPOSIUM - LAZARUS 583 
isting environmental protection laws to the civil rights context. 
Neither has proved to be a nice or easy fit. The civil rights 
law model seemed better designed for the fair, nondiscrimina-
tory allocation of benefits, rather than the burdens of govern-
mental regulation. The environmental protection model turned 
out to be not especially well designed for consideration of eco-
nomic or socioeconomic concerns, or for an accounting to the 
subjective factors motivating particular decisionmakers. 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is illustrative of both 
the potential reach and limitations of civil rights law in the en-
vironmental. context. Title VI imposes a nondiscrimination 
mandate on recipients of federal financial assistance: "No per-
son in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."53 
Title VI is relevant to environmental protection generally 
and environmental justice, in particular, because of the sheer 
number of activities affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment that receive some form of federal financial assistance. 
The federal government spends considerable sums on those 
that pollute and on those that regulate pollution, including 
state and local governments. All are potentially subject to Title 
VI's nondiscrimination mandate. 54 . 
Title VI is especially significant to environmental justice 
because existing judicial precedent supports the authority of a 
federal agency's promulgating regulations extending Title VI's 
nondiscrimination mandate to activities or programs with a 
discriminatory or disparate impact.55 Proof of a violation, ac-
cordingly, does not require a showing of discriminatory intent . 
. Such subjective motivation is always hard to prove, but has 
been an especially high hurdle in the environmental context 
given the sheer number of actors and possible motivations for 
relevant decisions. Indeed, every environmental justice plaintiff 
who has sought to prove an equal protection violation, which 
requires just such a showing of discriminatory intent, has 
failed.56 Most federal agencies, including EPA, have Title VI 
5l 42 U.s.c. § 2000d (1994). 
5' See gmerally James H. Colopy, Tire Road Less Traveled: Pursllillg Elwirollmelltal 
jllstice Throllgh Title VI OJ the Civil Rights Act oJ 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 125 (1994). 
55 See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of the City of New York, 
463 U.s. 582 (1983). 
56 See, e.g., KISE., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd 977 
F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); Bean v. Southwest Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 674 (S.D. 
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regulations that extend to a prohibition on disparate impact.57 
Another particularly attractive aspect of Title VI for envi-
ronmental justice plaintiffs is current judicial precedent sup-
porting the availability of a private right of action to enforce 
Title VI regulations.58 Theoretically, therefore, the environ-
mental justice organization is not wholly dependent for en-
forcement of Title VI on the willingness of the federal agency 
that has funded the activity that allegedly results in the forbid-
den disparate impact. The aggrieved individuals or community 
representatives may initiate their own enforcement action 
based on Title VI regulations against the recipient of federal 
aid. 
The Clinton Administration early on indicated a willing-
ness to develop an effective environmental justice program 
based on Title VI. The President issued an executive order on 
environmental justice in February 1994 that referred repeatedly 
to Title VI and instructed agencies to develop strategies to 
identify and address 1/ disproportionately high and adverse 
human health or environmental effects [of its programs, poli-
cies, activities] on minority populations and low-income popu-
lations."59 Pursuant to that executive order, EPA took the lead 
in the order's implementation both convening an interagency 
Federal Working Group on Environmental Justice and develop-
ing EPA's own environmental justice strategy. 60 
At least within EPA, the impact of this planning process 
has been the proliferation within the Agency of a series of de-
centralized changes in planning and decision making processes 
involving standard setting, public participation and enforce-
ment.61 The Agency has also sought to implement Title VI by 
developing comprehensive guidance regarding the investiga-
tions of allegations that an EPA-funded program or activity is 
resulting in a disparate impact in violation of Title VI.62 As of 
Tex. 1979). 
57 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35 (1999). 
58 See il/fra'note 64 and accompanying text. 
59 Exec. Order No, 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg, 7629 (February 11, 1994), 
hO [d, § 1-102. The work of EPA's National Environmental Justice Advisory 
Committee, on which the author served for several years, reflects the extent of EPA's 
commitment to developing a meaningful environmental justice strategy for the 
Agency. See, e.g., U.S. EI/virollmelltal Protectioll Agellcy Office Of Ell vi rOllin ell tal Justice In 
tile Matter of the Fifth Meetillg of the National Envirolllnelltal JlIstice Advisory COllncil, 9 
ADMIN. L.J. 623 (1995). 
61 Lazarus, SIlpra note 23, at 265-69. 
62 See Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering En-
vironmental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised 
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this past November, EPA had received more than 100 Title VI 
administrative complaints,63 and there have been several pri-
vate Title VI actions filed in court.64 Many of these actions are 
directed against state and local governments. Some challenge 
permitting decisions; others challenge broader policy initia-
tives. 
Notwithstanding good faith agency intention, the task of 
implementing Title VI has proven far more difficult than either 
EPA officials or environmental justice community representa-
tives likely anticipated in the first instance. While EPA has 
dismissed a substantial number of the administrative com-
plaints on procedural grounds (e.g., the alleged violator was 
not a recipient of EPA financial assistance),65 the Agency has 
decided only one case on the merits, which it dismissed.66 The 
reason is simultaneously simple and complex. It turns out to be 
exceedingly difficult to develop criteria for the assessment of 
disparate impact violations and remedies in the environmental 
regulatory context. 
The root problem in undertaking a disparate inquiry in the 
environmental regulatory context appears to be causation in 
the first instance and redressability in the second. The causa-
tion problem derives from the multiplicity of both public and 
private decision makers connected to the amount of pollution 
occurring in anyone area or areas. It is far from obvious how 
one should decide the relevant universe of either the regulator 
or the regulated in deciding whether a disparate impact has 
occurred. The redressability problem stems from the difficult 
policy issues presented in deciding whether there are mitigat-
ing actions that the recipient may take to make acceptable what 
is otherwise unacceptable and, alternatively, whether there are 
circumstances when a disparate impact may be justified under 
Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits 
(Draft Revised Investigation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650-39,701 ijune 27, 2000). 
63 An up-to-date listing of Title VI complaints filed with EPA can be found at the 
website of EPA's Office of Environmental Justice. See http://www.epa.gov 
/ ocrpagelj docs/t6~snov2000.pdf (last.visited March 24, 2001). 
M See, e.g., New York City Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 
2000); Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556 (11th Cir. 1996). 
65 See Bradford Mank, Tile Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guid-
allces: Too Muell Discretioll for EPA and a More DiffiCll1t Standard for Complaillts?, 30 
ENVTL. L. RPTR. 11,144, 11,147 (Dec. 2000). 
66 See_Letter from Ann E. Goode, Director of EPA's Office of Civil Rights to Fa-
ther Phil Schmitter and Sister Joanne Chiaverini, Co-Directors, st. Francis Prayer 
Center, and Russell Harding, Director, Mich. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, regarding the 
Select Steel Complaint (Oct. 30, 1998) (on file with author); see Luke W. Cole, Wrollg 011 
the Facts, Wrollg 011 the Law, 29 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10,775 (Dec. 1999). 
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Title VI. 
EP A has, to date, only begun to answer these Title VI cau-
sation and redressability issues in a single context: permit-
ting.67 It has identified but not yet considered other contexts 
such as the Agency's setting of environmental standards and 
enforcement policies.68 Permitting, however, has hardly proven 
to be an easy terrain for a first step, but a stumbling ground 
instead. 
A straightforward example is illustrative. In Alabama, the 
Center for Race, Poverty, and the Environment has filed an 
administrative complaint with EPA alleging that the State's 
permitting of landfill facilities has resulted in a disparate im-
pact unlawful under the federal agency's Title VI regulations.69 
In processing that complaint on the merits, EPA has to address 
at a minimum three questions: 
(1) Whether there is a disparate impact; 
(2) Whether the disparate impact is proscribed by the 
Agency's Title VI regulations; 
(3) Whether an otherwise unlawful disparate impact 
may, through mitigating measures, be rendered permis-
sible. 
Each of these inquiries eludes an obvious response.70 The first 
itself breaks down into at least four further inquiries: 
(1) What kind of impacts are relevant to the disparate 
impact inquiry? 
(2) What are the relevant sources of those impacts? 
(3) What is the baseline in comparison for determining 
whether a disparity exists? 
(4) What degrees in difference constitute a "disparity" 
for disparate impact purposes? 
The ambiguities associated with causation complicate these 
inquiries. 
The "impact" inquiry has several possible scopes, with 
vastly different policy implications. The narrowest approach 
would be to take into account only proven adverse human 
health impacts. This would place outside the scope of relevant 
67 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650-39,651 Oune 27, 2000). 
68 See id. 
69 See supra note 16. 
70 For a general discussion of the associated difficulties, see National Advisory 
Council for Environmental Policy and Technology, Report of the Title VI Implementa-
tion Advisory Committee, Next Steps for EPA, State, and Local Environmental lustice 
Programs (March 1, 1999). The author served as a member of the EPA's Title VI Im-
plementation Advisory Committee. 
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impacts unrealized environmental risks, even though the envi-
ronmental statutes are, by their nature, primarily focused on 
risks rather· than impacts. Embedded within this threshold is-
sue, accordingly, is the fundamental question concerning the 
extent to which the government should pursue a precautionary 
approach that guards against risk qua risk rather than certain, 
demonstrated adverse human health effects. 
The full spectrum of possible approaches is further sug-
gested by considering the broadest possible approach to the 
impact inquiry. The broadest approach would be to take into 
account all of the impacts proximately caused by the facility to 
be permitted, regardless of whether those impacts are those 
within the authority of the relevant permit authority to con-
sider. For instance, when state authorities were considering 
granting a permit for the locating of a solid waste facility in 
Chester, Pennsylvania, one of the primary impacts ofthat facil-
ity was going to be the exceedingly high number of trucks us-
ing residential streets to travel to the facility.71 The sheer num-
ber of trucks threatened to devastate the community, with 
noise and air pollution and by their physical disruption of the 
streets. Such an impact is only indirectly related to the hazards 
regulated by an agency charged with ensuring against risks 
generated by the solid wastes themselves. 
A related issue is whether an impact can be deemed suffi-
ciently "adverse" for the purpose of disparate impact analysis 
if the facility is in compliance with all applicable environmental 
permitting requirements. The more relaxed approach here 
would be to allow for such a defense, based on the theory that 
statutory requirements are intended to guard against unrea-
sonably adverse risks; compliance therefore can fairly be 
equated with the absence of such effects. The opposing argu-
ment is that the statutes provide no such guarantee. Not all 
environmental requirements are health-based; many are in-
stead based on technolOgical or economic feaSibility and fail, 
moreover, to take into account the possible aggregation of mul-
tiple sources of pollution. Such requirements do not, accord-
ingly, provide a guarantee that permitted effects will not be 
adverse, let alone distributed without disparate effect. Were 
statutory compliance a defense, Title VI would arguably be 
meaningless, because it would add nothing to what is already 
71 Sheila Foster, !lIstice from the Grollnd Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resis-
tance, and the Transfonnative Politics of tIle EnviTOlllnental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. 
REV. 775,780 (1998). 
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required by the environmental statutes. 
Determining the relevant sources for the disparate impact 
inquiry likewise raises a host of controversial matters. In the 
unlikely event that there is only one relevant source of what-
ever impact is allegedly disparate, the natural question is 
whether there can ever be a disparate impact based on one sin-
gle facility. The likelihood of that occurring naturally turns on 
how broadly or narrowly one defines the denominator for pur-
poses of the disparate impact analysis. If a generic unit of envi-
ronmental risk serves as the baseline, the single source phe-
nomenon is unlikely to occur. The more precisely, however, 
one defines the particular risk involved, the greater the likeli-
hood that every site will be seen as distinct and therefore the 
less likely a finding of disparate impact. 
A closely related question arises in the more likely scenario 
where there are multiple sources of the relevant impact. The 
question concerns how one defines the universe of sources in 
deciding whether a disparate impact exists. In this context, the 
more relaxed approach would be to consider only sources of 
the impact regulated by the specific permitting agency, the de-
cisions of which are being challenged under Title VI. Under 
that view, the permitting agency would be responsible only for 
its own decisions and not for disparate impacts for which it 
may have been a contributing, but not independent cause. The 
sources that would fall outside the scope of the determination 
whether a disparate impact exists would be sources regulated 
by other permitting agencies (for instance, those located in 
other jurisdictions) and, perhaps even more significantly, un-
regulated sources. For many types of pollutants, there are ex-
emptions that, in aggregation, may add up to substantial 
amounts of pollution. 
A far more demanding approach under Title VI would be 
to make the disparate impact inquiry without being limited to 
just those sources regulated by the specific permitting agency 
subject to the Title VI claim. The disparate impact determina-
tion would, accordingly, be made separate from a determina-
tion of the extent to which the permitting agency should be 
deemed legally responsible for the disparity. Such an approach 
could allow for a remedy proportionate to the permitting 
agency's contribution to the problem. Alternatively, under a 
theory of responsibility more analogous to joint and several 
liability, a more demanding approach might even support 
holding the permitting agency more broadly responsible for 
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guarding against the resulting disparity in environmental im-
pact. At this endpoint of possible approaches, it could even be 
made a per se violation of Title VI disparate impact regulations 
to allow "any additional environmental impact to a community 
already subject to a disparate impact. 
A related, difficult issue concerns the proper treatment of 
an application for a permit renewal where, as might happen, 
there is reason to suspect that a disparate impact now exists 
that did not exist at the time of the original permit issuance 
years ago. The more lenient option would be to exempt the fa-
cility seeking a permit renewal from any scrutiny under Title 
VI regulations. The justification for such leniency would be that 
the facility is seeking merely to continue ongoing operations. 
So long as the facility is not increasing its emissions, it should 
not be considered legally responsible for any existing disparity 
in impact. The directly opposing view would be that the initial 
permit was, by its own terms, of limited duration and that a 
permit renewal application should be treated no differently 
than a new application. There should be no grand-fathering of 
existing disparities. Under that view, to the extent that the fa-
cility seeking a permit renewal has, based on existing invest-
ment-backed expectations, more compelling equitable circum-
stances than a truly new proposed facility, those kind of policy 
concerns should play a role in the allocation of responsibility 
between new and existing sources. They do not support an ab-
solute defense to any legal responsibility. 
The same point/ cQunterpoint debates similarly emerge in 
answering the other questions posed by the disparate impact 
inquiry. In determining the relevant baseline for purposes of 
the necessary comparison, one has to select certain spatial and 
temporal dimensions. Their selection may dramatically affect 
the conclusion. The same may be said for deciding how big the 
difference must be for it to be "disparate." Any difference? A 
significant difference? A statistically significant difference 
based on standards of deviation analysis? There is likely to be 
great disagreement regarding the" correct" answers to each of 
these questions and, because of the significant practical and 
policy stakes of different answers, also tremendous contro- . 
versy. 
Finally, there are a host of redressability issues that are no 
less controversial in nature. These relate to the circumstances 
under which a disparate impact may be "justified" and, there-
fore, not proscribed by Title VI regulations. They also concern 
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the circumstances under which, if any, a permitting agency 
may require mitigation of the disparate impact by providing 
offsetting benefits. A justification defense, for example, could 
be as relaxed as 1/ economic profitability" or as demanding as 
"public health emergency." A mitigation policy could be so 
flexible as to allow for the "trading off" of human health risks 
in favor of employment opportunities and other economic 
benefits; or it could strictly provide that the only legitimate 
mitigation are measures that address the very impact that is the 
source of th~ disparity and, in effect, eliminate the disparity. 
Each of these redressability issues implicates health/ economic 
cost and benefit tradeoffs that have long eluded consensus in 
environmental law and that have persisted instead in generat-
ing substantial controversy. 
EPA has recently been struggling to offer at least some 
tentative answers to some of these issues, first, in issuing 
interim guidance,72 and more recently, in issuing revised 
interim guidance.73 The Agency has, not surprisingly, received 
few accolades for its efforts. Nor is that likely to change in the 
near future. The ingredients for consensus are too absent in this 
setting. Most simply put, the policy implications of competing 
choices are simply too disparate and the law too unformed to 
allow for either easy compromise or clear answers. 
The regulated community and many of the state agencies 
that would be directly subject to EPA's Title VI scrutiny also 
harbor a natural antipathy to the entire undertaking. The for-
mer has long complained about the rigors of environmental 
protection requirements. The latter instinctively rebels against 
further federal intrusions on state regulatory authority. For 
each, the specter of an additional layer of environmental re-
quirements, based not on either human health, economic effi-
ciency, or technological feasibility, but on EPA's ephemeral 
notions of equity is untenable. The equity touchstone is too un-
certain in its meaning and application because of its enormous 
variability. What equity would additionally require could de-
pend on the actions of other sources, other communities, and 
other permitting authorities. Neither the state regulators nor 
their respective regulated communities relish a legal regime so 
72 See u.s. EPA, Interim Guidance on Investigating Title VI Administrative 
Complaints Challenging Permits (February 1998); June M. Lyle, Reactions to EPA's 
Interim Guidance: The Growing Battle for Control over Environmental lustice Decisiolllnak-
ing, 75 IND. L.J. 687 (2000). 
13 See sf/pra note 62. 
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uncertain in its scope and application. 
Finally, there is a case currently pending before the United 
States Supreme Court (likely to be decided about the same time 
this article goes to press) that will likely affect the future sig-
nificance of Title VI in the environmental protection context. In 
Alexander v. Sandoval/4 the Court is currently considering 
whether private parties may initiate private rights of action to 
enforce a federal agency's Title VI disparate impact regulations. 
There is strong precedent in the Court's decisions that such an 
implied private right of action to enforce Title VI exists75 and it 
would seem at least somewhat counterintuitive to suppose that 
a private right of action may exist to enforce a statutory pro-
scription but not to enforce valid agency regulations promul-
gated pursuant to that same proscription. 
There is nonetheless reason to anticipate that the Court 
may rule against the existence of an implied private of action to 
enforce a federal agency's disparate impact ban under Title VI. 
The primary basis for such speculation is that the current Court 
is likely to be skeptical of the legitimacy of the disparate impact 
ban itself,76 It was a sharply splintered- Court that created the 
judicial precedent in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission 
of the City of New York,77 that courts have since read as uphold-
ing the authority of federal agencies to promulgate regulations 
under Title VI that, extending beyond the statutory prohibition 
on intentional discrimination, forbid federally-funded activities 
and programs with a disparate impact.78 
Short of revisiting the continuing validity of that aspect of 
Guardians, which does not seem to be a question fairly pre-
sented to the Court in Alexander, the Court might instead 
choose to split the difference by disallowing a private right of 
action for its enforcement. Indeed, that outcome might seem 
particularly attractive to the Court. It would be in keeping with 
the Court's recent rulings on implied private rights of action, 
which have been less expansive towards their creation than 
7< u.s. 5. ct. No. 99-1908 (argued January 16, 2001). 
75 See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service 
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.s. 385 (1986); see also Cannon 
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
76 See Thomas A. Lambert, Tile Case Against Disparate Impact SlIits, 34 GA. 1. REV. 
1155 (2000). 
77 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
78 See Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Calise of Action Under EPA's Title VI 
Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental/llstiee Plailltijjs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 
1. 1, 12-20 (1999); see e.g., David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1988); Sandoval v. 
Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 5. Ct. 128 (2000). 
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earlier caselaw that supports its existence under Title VI in 
generaI,79 In addition, because Alexander involves a suit against 
a State, such a disposition would be gener<;tlly consistent with 
the Court's recent reluctance to suppose congressional intent or 
authority to allow private lawsuits against sovereign States.so 
Were the Supreme Court in Alexander to limit the ability of 
private parties to enforce Title VI regulations in court, the effec-
tiveness of any restrictions on disparate impact imposed by 
such regulations would be sharply limited, but not eliminated. 
Plaintiffs would lose the current leverage they possess to 
threaten recipients of federal funds, and those seeking permits 
from such recipients, with Title VI lawsuits based on disparate 
impact. That leverage has, even in the absence of any formal 
successful adjudication on the merits, been sufficient to gener-
ate a series of creative settlements advantageous to environ-
mental justice communities.S1 
Enforcement of the disparate impact prohibition would in-
stead be exclusively controlled by the federal agencies them-
selves, through administrative proceedings. Given the diffi-
culty those agencies, including EPA, have had in deciding what 
the disparate impact requirement even means, one might fairly 
anticipate that administrative enforcement is likely to be less 
than extensive. Because, moreover, courts are traditionally re-
luctant to second guess agency decisions involving the exercise 
of their enforcement authority,82 there is likely to be little, if 
any, meaningful judicial review of such agency determinations. 
For all these reasons, Title VI may ultimately prove to be a 
far less effective basis for legal redress on behalf of environ-
mental justice communities than many anticipated just a few 
years ago. While its epitaph need not be written, environmental 
justice communities would be prudent to continue to explore 
more fully other possible, untapped legal bases for redress, in-
cluding the environmental protection laws themselves. S3 
79 See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
80 See, e.g., Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765 
(2000); Bd. of Tru. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct 955 (2001). 
81 See Lazarus, supra note 23, at 272. 
82 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
83 Professor Gerald Torres has even suggested that too closely tying environ-
mental justice to racism and to a civil rights law framework may be "the wrong road 
to follow if real changes for the communities at risk are to be achieved." Torres, supra 
note 10, at 602. His suggestion is especially portentous because Professor Torres was 
one of the primary authors of the President's Executive Order on Environmental Jus-
tice. See gellerally Gerald Torres, Changing the Way Govemment Views Environmental 
Justice, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 543 (1994) (discussing the structure and pur-
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III. BI-WAYS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
The future of environmental justice is more likely to lie at 
least as much outside civil rights law as within. It is also likely 
to be found in the fair and effective enforcement of existing 
laws rather than in their significant substantive amendment. As 
much as civil rights laws provide an essential pathway for en-
vironmental justice, especially because of the symbolic signifi-
cance of their mere invocation, the existing environmental pro-
tection statutes provide an additional avenue for environ-
mental justice advocates. 
Like civil rights laws, the environmental statutes constitute 
one of the great successes of the second half of the twentieth 
century in the United States. Emissions of significant air pollut-
ants, such as particulate matter and lead, dropped more than 
eighty and ninety-eight percent respectively, while the popula-
tion, gross domestic product, and vehicular use increased by 
more than twenty-seven, ninety, and 111 percent. Emissions of 
carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and sulfur simi-
larly decreased significantly. With the exception of southern 
California, the pollution standard index in major U.S. urban 
areas improved by seventy-two percent from 1985-1994; many 
of the nation's waters are far cleaner than before; and hundreds 
of abandoned and inactive hazardous waste sites have been 
cleaned up.84 
There are, to be sure, significant examples of lapses as well, 
either because of statutory exemptions, regulatory exclusions, 
limited administrative agency resources, or lack of political 
wil1.85 The plight of environmental justice communities are, 
moreover, an example of such a lapse. In many instances, how-
ever, the source of the problem in existing environmental laws 
for these communities is not traceable to either a statutory ex-
emption or regulatory exclusion. The statutes as written pro-
vide many legal bases for effectively addressing the problems 
of these communities. The problems have instead mostly re-
sulted from the lack of creative and effective implementation 
and enforcement of existing law on behalf of the legitimate en-
vironmental protection concerns of many communities.86 
poses of President Clinton's Executive Order on environmental justice). 
84 ANDREWS, supra note 24, at 280-81. 
85 See, e.g., J.B. Rubl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and EnvironmerJtal Law, 27 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000). 
86 I have more fully explored elsewhere the extent to which provisions in exist-
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This brings us back to the second highway described at the 
outset of this essay: the highways surrounding the City of At-
lanta in neighboring Georgia. The image of Atlanta's highways 
is no doubt less visually striking than the proposed landfill ad-
jacent to U.S. 80. It is, however, no less striking in its relevance 
to environmental justice. The Atlanta highway system also ef-
fectively illustrates environmental law's existing, largely un-
tapped potential. 
Atlanta's highway system has the highest vehicular miles 
travelled (VMTs) of any place in the world for a reason. The 
metropolitan area is marked by a low density development pat-
tern dependent on an extensive system of highways. Although 
these highways are typically dubbed "freeways," they are free 
only in the sense that there is no direct user charge applied to 
those who decide to drive on them. They are certainly not free 
to the extent they costs hundreds of millions of tax dollars to 
construct and maintain. And, they are certainly not free in 
terms of the environmental harm that they proximately cause.87 
The City of Atlanta suffers from at least a "serious" ozone 
pollution problem.88 The area exceeds national ambient air 
quality standards designed to safeguard public health.89 The 
metropolitan area's failure to meet the health standard for 
ozone threatens everyone, but especially those who live in the 
urban core, and who are disproportionately poor and the most 
susceptible to the pollutant's adverse impacts. 
There are, of course, substantial benefits to such an exten-
sive system of freeways. Among the direct beneficiaries are 
those wealthy enough to live in the suburbs surrounding At-
lanta, who commute by automobile into the city. The highway 
system, in effect, subsidizes those who chose to live further 
away, both making it possible for them to do so and enhancing 
their residential property values. Seemingly not comparably 
subsidized, however, have been the mass transit options of 
those living in the poorer, often racial minority, neighborhoods 
ing federal environmental laws may authorize EPA to consider more fully environ-
mental justice concerns in their implementation of those laws. See Richard J. Lazarus 
& Stephanie Tai, Illtegratillg Ellvirollmelltal JI/stice illto EPA Permittillg Authority, 26 
ECOLOGY L Q. 617 (1999). 
87 See Jill Jordan Seider, Traffic Jam: III Atlallta, A Pitched Battle Over Roads Pollu-
tioll, alld Boulldless Urball Sprawl, u.s. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 8, 1999, at 28 available. 
88 40 C.F.R § 81.311 (2001). 
89 Id.; see Barney Tumey, Ellvirollmelltal, Civil Rights Groups File Suit to Halt High-
way COllstmctioll ill Atlallta Area, 32 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 341 (February 23,2001). 
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of Atlanta.9o 
Because Atlanta's highway system plainly involves federal 
funding, the possibility that federal transportation funds are 
being spent by the state in a manner that disproportionately 
disfavors minority residents necessarily raises a potential Title 
VI issue. Local community members have, in fact, already filed 
such a claim.91 It is nonetheless environmental law, not civil 
rights law, that has the potential for more sweeping and effec-
tive legal redress. 
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, as amended in 1990, federal 
transportation funds cannot be spent in a manner not in "con_ 
formity" with federal environmental statutory air quality re-
quirements.92 To satisfy that standard, Georgia must prepare a 
"state implementation plan" (SIP) that satisfies the Air Act's 
strict requirements for geographic area, like the Atlanta metro-
politan area in "nonattainment" for ozone.93 It also means that 
the State must prepare a regional transportation plan that, also 
subject to federal approval, will not contribute to VMTs in a 
manner inconsistent with the Clean Air Act.94 Because Geor-
gia's SIP will pass muster under the Clean Air Act only if it is 
capable of significantly reducing VMTs or at least their growth, 
a regional transportation plan must likewise call for federal 
transportation monies to be spent in a manner that contributes 
to that reduction. 
The Clean Air Act, in short, should require the State of 
Georgia to spend less federal money on expanding and main-
taining a system of highways that increases VMTs and more 
federal money on promoting transportation options, such as 
mass transit, that can reduce VMTs over the long term. The re-
allocation of federal funds will simultaneously be potentially 
progressive in its distributional effect. The transportation op-
tions more important to the poorer communities in Atlanta will 
receive a larger share of the federal subsidies. 
Federal and State governmental officials, environmental 
organizations, and environmental justice community groups 
were very close to a major settlement of the related legal issues 
90 See generally ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., SPRAWL CITY: RACE, POLITICS, AND 
PLANNING IN ATLANTA (Island Press 2000). 
91 See Robert D. Bullard, Race, Equity and Smart Growth, 3 TRANSP. EQUITY No.1 
(Environmental Research Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University)( Fall/Winter 
. 2000). 
92 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c) (1994). 
91 See id. § 7410(a)(2)(I), 7S11a(c). 
94 See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 167 F.3d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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this past December that would have accomplished just such a 
redistribution of federal transportation funding. 95 It would 
have been a landmark settlement for environmental justice. 
Unfortunately, the settlement negotiations broke down in the 
final hours.96 
Whatever the cause of the settlement's collapse, a coalition 
of national environmental organizations, regional environ-
mental organizations, and local environmental justice commu-
nity representatives have now filed a series of lawsuits against 
EPA, the federal Department of Transportation, and the State 
of Georgia.97 They are challenging the Department of Transpor-
tation's approval of the State's regional transportation plan, on 
the ground that it lacks the required conformity with the fed-
eral Clean Air Act. They are seeking a judicial order that EPA 
reclassify under that Act the Atlanta Air Quality District from 
"serious" to "severe" for nonattainment with ozone. And, they 
are asking the federal district court to compel EPA to disap-
prove Georgia's SIP on the ground that it will not achieve the 
"reasonable further progress" towards attainment of ozone 
standards mandated by the federallaw.98 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental law has come a long way since the Rever-
end Dr. Martin Luther King marched along U.S. Route 80 from 
Selma to Montgomery over thirty-Six years ago. Much has hap-
pened since his assassination thirty-three years ago in Mem-
phis. Back then, there was no EPA. No Clean Air Act. No Clean 
Water Act. No Superfund law. No Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act. And no Endangered Species Act. Nor were there 
the state analogues that today exist in every state. 
Today, the vast legal infrastructure of environmental law is 
firmly in place, and well settled. The challenge is not so much 
the need for new laws. It is instead for effective and fair im-
plementation and enforcement of existing laws. 
95 Kelly Simmons, Environmental Grollps Conditionally Accept State Plan on Roads, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 12, 2000, at D3. 
96 Kelly Simmons, Agreement on Roads Broke Down in Details, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., Jan. 4, 2001, at 3B; Barney Tumey, Atlanta Transportation Plan Settlement Falls 
Apart; Environmental Grollps to SlIe, 32 ENVIR. REP.(BNA) 16 Oanuary 5, 2001). 
91 See Kelly Simmons, Environmental Groups Sue Over Road Building, ATLANTA J. 
& CONST., Feb. 14,2001, at 3C; Barney Tumey, Environmental. Civil Rights Groups File 
Suit to Halt Highway COllstructioll in Atlanta Area, 32 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 341 (February 
23,2001). 
98 See 42 V.S.c. § 7502(c)(2) (1994). 
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It sounds deceptively easy. But it is not. It will not be easy 
to change the transportation habits of a major metropolitan 
area like Atlanta. But it was not easy in 1965 to march across a 
bridge in Selma. 
What was required then and now are risktakers: Public 
citizens with a passion. This includes law students and lawyers 
who are not complacent, but agitated. They are willing to mas-
ter the complexity of environmental law. They are willing to 
overcome the high institutional hurdles impeding its effective 
enforcement. And they are willing to serve those communities 
who have too long suffered from environmental injustice. 
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